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I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the utility of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934' and its implementing rule, Securities &
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-S, 2 in providing a remedy for a
minority shareholder who is the victim of a squeeze-out or other
form of oppression. The term "squeeze-out" means the elimination
of one or more shareholders of a business by those who control it,
through the use of their powers of control, inside information, or
other technique, without fair value being paid in return. 3 Of course,
a minority shareholder need not be deprived of his shares to be
treated unfairly by his fellow shareholders or by the directors and
officers whom they control. He can be oppressed by action of the
majority which reduces his claim on the corporation's assets or
deprives him of the return on his investment to which he is entitled.
Numerous techniques may be employed by those in control of a
corporation to benefit themselves at the expense of the minority:
4
t This article has been adapted from a treatise written by Professor O'Neal entitled:
"Squeeze-Outs" of Minority Shareholders: Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates, to
bu published by Callaghan & Company and used here by permission. All rights reserved.
A.B. 1938, J.D. 1940, Louisiana State University; J.S.D., Yale University, 1949;
S.J.D., Harvard University, 1954; James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University.
r - B.A., Wittenberg University, 1969; J.D., Duke University, 1974; Associate, Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue, Cleveland, Ohio.
1 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
- The most comprehensive study presently in print of what causes squeeze-outs, what
techniques are used to effect them, and what can be done to prevent them, is F. O'Neal & J.
Dcrwin, Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates: "Squeeze-Outs" in Small Enterprises
(l61). An expanded revision of this work, focusing on squeeze-outs in corporations, F.
O'Neal, "Squeeze-Outs" of Minority Shareholders: Expulsion or Oppression of Business
Associates, will be published in 1975. The former will hereinafter be cited as O'Neal &
Dcrwin, the latter as O'Neal.
4 O'Neal & Derwin, supra note 3, at cbs. 3-5; O'Neal, supra note 3, chs. 3-6.
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the squeezers may refuse to declare dividends;5 they may drain off
the corporation's earnings by exorbitant salaries and bonuses to the
majority shareholder-officers and perhaps to their relatives, 6 by high
rental agreements for property the corporation leases from majority
shareholders, 7 or by unreasonable payments under contracts be-
tween the corporation and majority shareholders; 8 they may deprive
minority shareholders of corporate offices and of employment by the
company;9 they may cause the corporation to sell its assets at an
inadequate price to the majority shareholders or to companies in
which the majority is interested;10 they may organize a new com-
pany in which the minority will have no interest, transfer the
corporation's assets or business to it, and perhaps then dissolve the
old corporation;11 or they may bring about the merger or consolida-
tion of the corporation under a plan unfair to the minority. 12 These
techniques merely illustrate the devices used by resourceful squeez-
ers; furthermore, squeeze techniques often-in fact generally-are
used in various combinations. 13
A lawyer representing a minority shareholder who is being
squeezed out or otherwise oppressed should always explore remedies
that may be available under federal securities laws, especially Rule
lob-5.14 Indeed, Rule 10b-5 has been accurately described as "the
5 O'Neal & Derwin § 3.04, at 44; O'Neal §§ 3.04-.05.
6 O'Neal & Derwin § 3.06, at 54; O'Neal §§ 3.07-.08.
7 O'Neal & Derwin § 5.02, at 100; O'Neal § 3.12.
8 O'Neal & Derwin § 5.02, at 100; O'Neal § 3.14.
9 O'Neal & Derwin § 3.05, at 52; O'Neal § 3.06.
10 O'Neal & Derivin § 4.08, at 78; O'Neal §§ 5.17-.20.
1 O'Neal & Derwin § 4.10, at 86; O'Neal § 5.25.
12 O'Neal & Derwin § 4.05, at 67; O'Neal §§ 5.13-.15.
13 O'Neal & Derwin § 3.02, at 42; O'Neal § 3.02.
14 In addition to section 10(b), other sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
other securities legislation can provide effective weapons for an oppressed minority share-
holder. For example, federal proxy requirements imposed by section 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970), and the corresponding SEC regulations, 17 CF.R.
§ 240.14a (1974), may prove useful in challenging a merger or other fundamental corporate
change prejudicial to minority shareholders. See Coalition to Advocate Pub. Util. Responsibil-
ity, Inc. v. Engels, 364 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Minn. 1973) (suit by minority shareholders alleging
that corporate insiders had proposed at the last minute a change in the number of directors
and a system of classifying and staggering the election of directors for a purpose of frustrating
minority shareholders' efforts to place a representative on the board, and in sponsoring these
changes had violated section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act and the federal proxy rules,
and breached fiduciary duties imposed by state law; the court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion ordering the insiders to cease activities in furtherance of the proposed changes until
further court order). See also O'Neal, supra note 3, at § 5.31.
Another provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c)(1) (1970), states in part: "No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce the
purchase or sale of, any security . . . by means of any manipulative, deceptive, or other
fraudulent device or contrivance. . . ." Rule 15 cl-2 to -9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 to -9 (1974),
implements section 15(c)(1) by defining what is meant by "any manipulative, deceptive, or
other fraudulent device or contrivance."
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most potent and the most versatile instrument in the armamen-
tarium of federal securities regulation. '15
This article does not provide an exhaustive analysis of Rule
10b-5's applicability to the complete catalogue of squeeze-out
techniques; 16 nor does it assess the roles played in Rule 10b-5
liability by concepts such as scienter, materiality, privity, and re-
liance.17 Many basic features of Rule 10b-5 liability remain unset-
tled; and the rules established by case law are constantly being
modified, limited, or refined. 18
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970), permits a
corporation to recover from an officer, director, or holder of 10 percent of a class of that
corporation's equity securities which are registered pursuant to the Act, any profit such
"insider" has made on any purchase and sale or sale and purchase of that corporation's equity
securities within a period of less than six months.
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970), provides:
Any person who ... sells a security ... by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of
a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall
not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to
the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for
such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), is almost identical
in wording to Rule 10b-5 except that § 17(a) focuses on fraud by the seller and affords a
remedy only to the buyer. The requirements for a private cause of action under § 17(a) have
been considered to be identical to those under Rule 10b-5. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479
F.2d 1227, 1280 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 727 n.2 (9th Cir. 1974).
See also Tucker v. Schwindt, [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,402, at
95,373. (D. Kan. 1974) (minority shareholders can recover damages in a derivative suit
under § 17(a)).
"s Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement
Cases, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1007 (1973).
16 For a comprehensive discussion of Rule 10b-5 as it applies to acts of corporate
mismanagement, see Jacobs, The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 in The Regula-
tion of Corporate Management, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 27 (1973). See also Cox, Fraud is in the
Eyes of the Beholder: Rule 10b-5's Application to Acts of Corporate Mismanagement, 47
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 674 (1972); Susman, Use of Rule 10b-5 As a Remedy for Minority Share-
holders of Close Corporations, 22 Bus. Law. 1193 (1967); Note, The Controlling Influence
Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1007 (1973).
17 For discussions of these topics, see R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation:
Cases and Materials 1070-72, 1127-32, 1184-85 (3d ed. 1972); Epstein, The Scienter Require-
ment in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. Rev. 482 (1970); Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution
of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1206 (1970); Meisenholder, Scienter and Reliance as Elements in Buyer's Suit
Against Seller Under Rule 10b-5, 4 Corp. Prac. Commentator 27 (Feb. 1963).
Is See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (trial court erred in
instructing the jury that defendant violated the federal securities laws if he made a material
misrepresentation even if he did not know the falsity of his statement); Eason v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974);
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
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This article does try to point out the tremendous potential of
Rule 10b-5 for redressing minority shareholder grievances. It shows
the broad scope of Rule 10b-5, as that rule has been interpreted and
applied by the courts, conveys an idea of the tremendous variety of
director, officer, and controlling shareholder acts that may fall
within the ambit of the Rule, and sets forth a number of illustrative
situations in which courts have applied the Rule to afford relief to
oppressed shareholders. Finally, it notes some of the advantages of
proceeding in federal court under Rule 10b-5 rather than proceeding
in a state court under state law.
II. THE SCOPE OF RULE 10b-5
Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any person "directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails"1 9 to "use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors., 20
Rule 10b-S gives a broad content to "manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance," by providing:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 21
The breadth of the Rule should be noted, as by its language it
reaches "any device" which is deceptively used by "any person"
19 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). The section also proscribes the illegal use "of any facility of
any national securities exchange," id., but this provision is not applicable to most corporate
"squeeze-outs."
20 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
21 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
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even if merely "in connection with" the purchase or sale of "any
security. "22
Although there may be some doubt that Congress intended
section 10(b) to apply to "private" deals in the securities of close
corporations, 23 the federal courts have firmly established that trans-
actions in shares are within the purview of that section and of Rule
lob-5, even though the shares are not listed on a securities exchange
nor traded in an over-the-counter market by established businesses
or brokers. 24 Thus, face-to-face or non-market transactions fall
within the purview of Rule 10b-5.25 Further, although neither sec-
tion 10(b) nor the implementing rule expressly provides for private
civil remedies, the courts have consistently permitted civil actions to
be brought by persons injured by a violation, 2 6 to recover dam-
22 "For § 10(b) bans the use of any deceptive device in the 'sale' of any security by 'any
person.' " Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971). For
interesting speculations on situations in which Rule 10b-5 might be applied, see Latty, The
Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C.
Statutes, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 505, 530-32 (1953). See also Comment, Rule 10b-5 and
Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Shares, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 307 (1966).
23 See Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1018 (1951).
24 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10-12 (1971); Fratt v.
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1953); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F.
Supp. 834, 841-42 (D.N.J. 1972); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 830-31 (D.
Del. 1951); Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145, 147-48 (E.D. Pa. 1950). See also Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), on request for
additional findings of fact, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). "I cannot agree . . . that
'investors' [as used in § 10(b)] is limited to persons who are about to invest in a security or that
two men who have acquired ownership of the stock of a corporation are not investors merely
because they own half of the total issue." 69 F. Supp. at 514. The courts agree on the result
but not on the line of reasoning by which the conclusion should be reached. See Fratt v.
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, at 630-31 (9th Cir. 1953).
25 Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (E.D. Pa.
1973); Schine v. Schine, 250 F. Supp. 822, 823 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 367 F.2d 685 (2d
Cir. 1966); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 960-61 (N.D.
lll. 1952).
26 Eg., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Fratt v.
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d
7,3, 787 (2d Cir. 1951); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457, 458 (D. Del. 1947);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
Rule 10b-5 has been held not to give a cause of action to a person injured by a sale if he is
neither the seller nor the buyer. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The Birnbaum purchaser-or-seller limitation has been
rejected by some courts. See Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (purchaser-seller limitation of Birnbaum case "is
not part of the law" of the Seventh Circuit); Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492
F.2d 136 (1973), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 302 (1974) (offeree who refused offer of stock made
pursuant to consent decree arising out of alleged antitrust violations is not subject to
purchaser-seller limitation); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J.
1972) (plaintiff-shareholders were neither buyers nor sellers in a stock transaction which
formed the basis of an alleged conspiracy to usurp voting control, but court held they had
standing to maintain an action under Rule 10b-5). Furthermore, subsequent cases decided in
the Second Circuit have suggested several exceptions to the Birnbaum limitation and thereby
have thrown in question the continuing validity of the Birnbaum rationale. See Drachmann v.
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ages 27 and, under some circumstances at least, to compel offenders
to account for profits realized. 28 Thus, a complaint which alleges
that a corporation's majority shareholders acquired stock of the
corporation. from minority shareholders through fraudulent rep-
resentations by use of the mails and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce has been held to state a cause of action under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 29
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not apply unless, in, the per-
formance of the proscribed act, use is made of the mails, a means or
Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (redemption of debentures in self-dealing transaction was
a "purchase" of a security, thus providing a basis for a derivative action by a minority
shareholder); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.) (en banc), rev'g 405 F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540(2d Cir. 1967) (cause of action found for injunctive relief but not damages); Vine v. Beneficial
Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Heyman v. Heyman,
356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (persons with a beneficial interest in securities bought or
sold have standing to maintain an action); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine:
A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 Va. L. Rev. 268 (1968); Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation
to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 684 (1968). Cf. SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S.
453, 464-72 (1969).
Despite the above-mentioned cases, the Birnbaun case has been strongly reaffirmed in
Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 909 (1970); see also GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971). Cf. Greenstein
v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968).
27 "Damages for such breach [of fiduciary duty in illegally calling stock] are usually, but
not always, measured according to principles of restitution." Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
135 F. Supp. 176, 179 (D. Del. 1955), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). Violation of Rule
10b-5 may also result in: (1) a shareholders' derivative action (if insiders have milked the
corporation by selling it shares at an excessive price or buying shares from it at an inadequate
price); and (2) a suit to rescind the transaction and recover the shares. See, e.g., Baumel v.
Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968), modified as to rescission, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970). Although the company's financial progress in
Baumel was far better than projected, the minority shareholders were told that the company
was not doing well and that their shares must be purchased by the company to be used as a
"sweetener" to obtain additional debt financing. The district court held Rule 10b-5 to be
applicable, as a result of which the minority shareholders were entitled to full restoration of
the shares subject to the sale "together with any dividends which may be declared and paid
thereon from the date of decree until the date of delivery, and . . . any transfer taxes which
may be imposed thereon." 283 F. Supp. at 148. The Fourth Circuit held that the minority
shareholders had waived their right to rescission of the sale by their delay of eighteen months
in bringing their 10b-5 action. 412 F.2d at 574-75.
28 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). In this case,
the two Slavins, who owned half the stock, had made a deal to sell the corporate assets to
outside interests. Without disclosing this fact, the Slavins bought out the Kardons, owners of
the other half of the stock, and then proceeded to consummate the deal with the outsiders.
The court treated the transaction as a sale by directors (in their own interest) of corporate
assets and held that the Kardons were entitled to an accounting to ascertain their share of the
profits. Id. at 801-02. In Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973), a
defrauded seller of securities was held to be entitled to "the benefit of whichever measure of
damages provides the greater recovery: either the difference between the sale price of the
stock . . . and its fair market value at [the time of the sale] or the amount of the fraudulent
buyer's profit on resale." Id. at 417.
29 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
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instrumentality of interstate commerce, or a facility of a national
securities exchange. 30 Conceivably, some transactions involving
fraudulent or deceptive practices in the purchase of securities might
not come within their purview for that reason. The cases, however,
have held that section 10(b) and its implementing rule apply as long
as the fraud or deception is employed "in connection with" a trans-
action in which use is made of the mails or a means or instrumental-
ity of commerce; the deceptive communication itself need not be
transmitted through those facilities. 3'
HI. APPLICATION OF RULE 10b-5 To VARIOUS SQUEEZE-OUT
TECHNIQUES
A. Withholding Information About the Value of Shares
A person who has sold his shares to the corporation's officers,
directors, or controlling shareholders, or to the corporation, perhaps
having been in part persuaded by the corporation's failure to pay
dividends or by other pressure tactics of those in control of the
corporation, often complains that the "insiders" misrepresented the
value of shares they bought from him for themselves or the corpora-
tion or that they brought his shares without disclosing information
affecting the shares' value. In these circumstances the aggrieved
seller clearly can obtain relief in an individual action under Rule
10b-5. 32 Interestingly enough, one case held that a corporation's
30 Even an intrastate phone call has been held to be enough "jurisdictional means"
where it is made over the same wires that carry interstate phone calls. See Myzel v. Fields,
387 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Bredehoeff v. Cornell, 360 F.
Supp. 557 (D. Ore. 1966); Nemitz v. Cunny, 221 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1963). But see Burke
v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 438 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1971); Rosen v. Albern Color Research,
Inc., 218 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
31 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1953); Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 961-64 (N.D. IIl. 1952).
The purpose of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
are similar and the phraseology employed is substantially similar. The court is of the
opinion the comparable guide to be followed is the construction of the courts with
respect to 17(a) and not 12(2). For this reason, the court holds that Section 10(b) does
not apply solely to interstate business and does not require that misrepresentations or
omissions be made through instrumentalities of commerce or through the mails.
Id. at 964. Cf. Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943) (construing
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933); Moore v. Gorman, 75 F. Supp. 453, 547 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) (same). But see the following cases construing § 12(2) of the Securities Act: Kemper v.
Lohnes, 173 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1949); Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Me. 1939),
aff'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940) (where the alleged misrep-
resentations were made in the interstate telephone conversation but the court also, evidently,
thought that a necessity).
32 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (con-
sciously false representation); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) (fraudulent
misrepresentations); Schine v. Schine, 250 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 367
F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1966) (failure to disclose negotiations to sell corporate assets); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (failure to disclose intended sale of
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attempts to buy its own stock from a shareholder at a "repeatedly
assets--"Under any reasonably liberal construction, these provisions apply to directors and
officers who, in purchasing the stock of the corporation from others, fail to disclose a fact
coming to their knowledge by reason of their position, which would materially affect the
judgment of the other party to the transaction." Id. at 800.). Cf. Note, 47 Texas L. Rev. 509
(1969). For cases in which a shareholder with less stock holdings deceived a shareholder with
larger individual holdings by false representation or nondisclosure in purchasing the larger
holder's shares, see Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966) (the defendants, as a
group, held more stock than the plaintiff); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
In Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 490 F.2d 539
(8th Cir. 1973), plaintiff argued that Rule 10b-5 required corporate officers and directors not
only to supply investors and shareholders with full information on a major corporate decision
affecting the value of the corporation's assets and the value of its stock, but also to interpret
the information and provide an expert opinion as to all possible ramifications of the decision
on investor interests. 341 F. Supp. at 243. The district court, however, read the Rule as
requiring no more "than full disclosure of all information which the ordinary investor of
common business experience would require in making an informed investment decision." Id.
Some courts permit an action to be maintained for damages against some wrongdoers
solely on the basis of a negligent misrepresentation or nondisclosure; they do not require fraud
or intent to deceive. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972) (brokerage firm, for negligence in controlling an agent); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Royal Air Prop., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d
210 (9th Cir. 1962). But see R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 17, commenting:
It may still be questioned, by those who have not despaired of any check by the
courts on the career of Rule 10b-5, whether any court would in fact impose a
crushing liability upon a corporate officer in favor of thousands of purchasers in the
market for simple negligence in the issuance of a press release.
Id. at 1072. Perhaps a few courts would impose liability for deception in the absence of any
fault whatever on the part of the defendant. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th
Cir. 1961). But see R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra, at 1071 expressing doubt that the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit would impose absolute liability, without any fault at all, on
the part of a defendant. See also Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 545 (D. Md. 1971) ("This
Court does not agree with plaintiffs that the test is one of absolute liability. . . .') Id. at 549.
In the Second Circuit, a cause of action under Rule 10b-S apparently does not exist "in the
absence of allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent to defraud, reckless disregard for
the truth, or knowing use of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud. It is insufficient to allege
mere negligence. . . ." Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammil & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir.
1971). See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973). But cf. SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-43 (2d Cir. 1973) (negligence is sufficient for injunctive relief against
attorney preparing opinion letters as an aider or abettor). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (injunction action
under Rule 10b-S can be based on negligence in issuance of corporate press release).
For the extent to which market information, as distinguished from operational informa-
tion, must be disclosed to avoid a violation of Rule lob-5, see SEC v. Great Am. Indus., 407
F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969) (in a face-to-face sale of property to
a corporation in exchange for the corporation's stock, a failure to disclose that a finder's fee of
two-thirds of the stock will be paid to intermediaries is a violation of Rule 10b-5); Chasns v.
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970) (stock brokerage firm's failure to disclose
to a customer, whose account it handled, that it was a "market maker" in securities it sold
that customer in the over-the-counter market was a failure to disclose a material fact within
Rule 10b-S).
At least one court has held that Rule 10b-S applies if a misrepresentation is made as to
the value of the consideration given for securities. Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir.
1956) (a fraudulent sale of overvalued oyster land for securities and real estate). Cf. Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (corporation's directors were
allegedly deceived into believing that the corporation would receive a certificate of deposit in
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published book value or less" were implied representations that the
prices offered were fair prices. 33
B. Withholding Dividends
Another frequent grievance of minority shareholders or of
former minority shareholders who have sold their stock is that
majority shareholders or the corporate managers depressed the
value of the corporation's stock, typically by keeping dividends to a
minimum, in order to buy minority stock at a bargain price. Ma-
nipulation of the market price of a corporation's stock and purpose-
ful reduction of dividends in order to buy out minority shareholders
cheaply has been held actionable under Rule 10b-5, 34 at least if the
suit is brought by a shareholder who has sold his stock and thus can
show a loss from the manipulation. 35 And, in a leading case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
complaint alleging that the corporation's controlling shareholders
had manipulated the market price of the corporation's stock and had
kept dividends to a minimum in order to force minority shareholders
to sell their shares at depressed values stated a cause of action for
injunctive relief to prevent the controlling shareholders from con-
tinuing to depress the price of the stock, although the complaint did
not state a claim for damages by minority shareholders who had not
sold their stock, at least in the absence of proof that those share-
holders had suffered a loss from the manipulations. 36
e change for its bonds, whereas in fact the proceeds from the bonds were credited to
defendant's account).
33 Cf. Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61, 138 (N.D. Ala.), stay
denied, 395 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1968). This action was predicated upon an Alabama criminal
statute dealing with officerldirector liability in manipulating the market and the court found
an implied civil remedy by analogy to the section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 cases. 348 F. Supp. at
146-47.
34 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 .F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), the court referred approvingly to the Cochran case:
"ID]eception may take the form of nonverbal acts: In Cochran v. Channing Corp. . . . it
consisted of reducing dividends in order to drive down the price of the corporation's stock.
And it need not be deception in any restricted common law sense . . . ." Id. at 768.
a- Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968) (where directors, officers, and
majority shareholders conspired to siphon the corporation's assets into another company,
depressing the market value of the corporation's stock, with a view to buying out minority
,hareholders by squeezing them out, but plaintiff minority shareholder did not sell his shares
and a planned merger of the corporation and the other company was abandoned, plaintiff was
not a "seller" and could not invoke a Rule 10b-5 remedy); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213,
227 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Cf. Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61 (N.D.
Ala.), stay denied, 395 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1968) (violation of state criminal statute making it a
criminal offense for corporate director or officer to depreciate value of corporate stock with
intent to buy occurs whenever director or officer does or omits to do an act with intent to
depreciate market value of the stock, even though he does not actually succeed in purchasing
any of the stock).
36 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (in a suit for
equitable or prophylactic relief it is not necessary to establish all the elements necessary in a
suit to recover monetary damages).
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C. Mergers
Rule 10b-5 also may provide relief for minority shareholders
aggrieved by a merger into which their corporation has entered or is
about to enter. A person who held shares in a corporation which has
merged into another company and who has received shares in the
surviving company in exchange for his old shares is a "seller" of the
old shares and a "purchaser" of the shares of the surviving company
within the meaning of Rule lob-5; 37 thus that person can maintain
an action under the Rule if the merger was accomplished or is being
accomplished by deception or fraud. 38 Since a person who holds
shares in the surviving corporation, as distinguised from one who
holds shares in a merging or "disappearing" corporation, ordinarily
is not called upon to exchange his shares for new securities, he
might not qualify as a "seller" or "buyer" of shares for individual
relief under Rule 10b-5. He can, however, bring a derivative action
on behalf of the corporation because the corporation would be a
"buyer" of the old shares held by shareholders in the disappearing
corporation and a "seller" of the new shares it issued in exchange. 39
At least one case, however, has held that a shareholder in the
37 See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969); Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 590 (5th Cir. 1974); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 415
F.2d 1326, 1330 (7th Cir. 1969); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 267 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). But cf. In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, [1973-74 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec L. Rep. 94,452, at 95,577 (3d Cir. 1974) (shareholders who were
induced to exchange their shares in a railroad for shares in a holding company by allegedly
false proxy statements cannot maintain an action under Rule 10b-5 to recover their losses; the
transaction does not come within the scope of the Rule because it constituted only "restructur-
ing" and not a merger).
38 Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1974); Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modified as to interest, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d
Cir. 1973). See also Voege v. Ackerman, 364 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (complaint by
minority shareholders of merged corporation alleging a conspiracy stated a Rule lob-5 cause
of action. " '[One who knowingly participates in or joins in an enterprise whereby a violation
of a fiduciary obligation is effected is liable jointly and severally with the recreant fiduciary.' "
Id. at 74, quoting Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1973)), vacated, 416 U.S. 38
(1974).
39 For cases holding that shareholders who allege violations of Rule 10b-5 but are not
"purchasers" or "sellers" of securities may nevertheless seek relief on behalf of the corporation
in a derivative suit if the corporation is a "purchaser" or "seller" of securities, see Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); City
Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970);
Williams v. Pennsylvania Co., 367 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (a corporation's minority
shareholders can maintain a derivative action under Rule 10b-5 against the corporation's
parent company where the equivalent of a merger-a "de facto" merger-has allegedly been
achieved by a round-about transaction induced by misrepresentations); Ross v. Longchamps,
Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434, 439 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974) ("te
issuance of stock is a sale of securities for 10b-5 purposes and ... an individual shareholder
although not a purchaser or seller can bring a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation
which has been fraudulently induced to issue its stock," in a refinancing plan if harm to the
corporation is shown. Id. at 765.).
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surviving company in a merger who is not called upon to exchange
his shares can maintain an individual action for relief under Rule
10b-5 if the exchange ratio provided by the merger plan favors the
disappearing corporation and the sponsors of the merger concealed
facts necessary for the shareholders to make an intelligent decision
on whether to consent to the merger.
40
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
held that a shareholder in a corporation that has merged with
another company under a short-form merger statute is entitled to
maintain an action under Rule 10b-5 grounded on the fraud in the
merger, even though he still retains possession of his original share
certificates. 4 1 He is, in fact, a "seller" of the stock even though he
still possesses it, the court said, because the only choice he has left is
to convert his shares into cash under the terms of the merger or have
them appraised and purchased under the state dissenters' rights
statute, unless of course he chooses to hold stock in a nonexistent
corporation. 4
2
A few decisions indicate that some courts may grant a minority
shareholder relief under Rule 10b-5 against a merger designed solely
to squeeze him out of the enterprise, even in the absence of any
deception. In a case arising in Georgia, 4 3 majority shareholders of
Corporation A formed a new company, Corporation B, and ex-
changed their stock in A for stock in B. They did not permit a
40 Nanfito v. Teksee Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1972) (the "purposes and
spirit" of the Securities Exchange Act compel that in mergers "shareholders of both the
disappearing and the surviving corporations [be given] the same remedies. .. ." Id. at 238.)
41 Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635-36 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967). For other cases applying the "forced seller" rationale of the Vine case, see
Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970) (shareholder's shares were converted
into a claim for cash by an allegedly fraudulent corporate liquidation); Crane Co. v. West-
inghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970)
(corporation holding shares in second corporation faced the threat of antitrust action if second
corporation's merger with a third company was accomplished); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins
Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
844 (1974). "Vine's informing principle, carried forward by Crane, is that a shareholder
should be treated as a seller when the nature of his investment has been fundamentally
changed from an interest in a going enterprise into a right solely to a payment of money for his
shares." Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 307 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971). But see Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974)
(dilution of shareholders' equity in corporation by a refinancing program providing for
debentures to be converted into unissued common stock did not give existing shareholders
standing as "forced sellers" to maintain action under Rule lob-S).
For a discussion of the standing of "forced," "aborted," or "frustrated" sellers or
"would-be" sellers to maintain an action under Rule 10b-5, see R. Jennings & H. Marsh,
supra note 17, at 1182-83.
42 374 F.2d at 634.
43 Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 490 F.2d
563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974). Cf. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969). See generally Comment, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1252
(1973).
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minority shareholder of A, a former officer of that corporation, to
purchase an interest in the new company, allegedly because of a
policy restricting ownership to persons in the "active employment"
of the company. Without disclosing plans they had for the expansion
of the enterprise, majority shareholders adopted a plan to merge the
two corporations. Under the plan the minority shareholder was to
be paid cash for his interest, as was permitted by the Georgia
merger statute. The federal district court found a violation of Rule
10b-5 and enjoined the merger. 44 The court concluded that the
majority shareholders' withholding information from the minority
shareholder about expansion plans was a violation of the Rule,
stating:
The creative birth of [Corporation B] with its alleviating
restrictions, was a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
[the minority shareholder] of his stock. The Court has
found that the sole purpose and intent of the organization
of [Corporation B] and the proposed merger was the elimi-
nation of the plaintiff. The proposed merger itself was a
course of business which would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon [the minority shareholder], in connection with the
sale of his stock.45
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 46 without
passing on the district court's findings of deception and without
deciding the "close question" of whether a plan can fall within Rule
10b-5 when it has "nothing to do with enabling the dissenting
stockholder to consider or decide or make any commitment with
respect to the sale of stock."'47 That court concluded that it could
bypass those issues because the plaintiff's allegations of violations of
federal securities laws presented serious and material questions; the
district court under its pendent jurisdiction could therefore adjudi-
cate any equitable cause of action that would lie under the same
proof and the same findings; and, the Georgia merger statute does
not permit a merger unless it comports "with equity in good con-
science."'48 Thus, the court held that a plan, without a business
purpose and designed solely to squeeze out a minority shareholder,
clearly violated plaintiff's rights under Georgia law.4 9 In other
words, the court of appeals approved the district court's decision,
but on the basis of general equity and state law.
44 343 F. Supp. at 1070.
4S Id.
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D. Other Squeeze-Out Techniques
Other types of oppressive conduct which may give rise to an
action under Rule 10b-5 include the following: a corporation's is-
suance or sale of stock or other securities for inadequate consider-
ation;50 a corporation's purchase of stock or other securities for an
excessive price;5' a corporation's purchase of stock for an improper
purpose, e.g., to avoid a shift of control or to "bail out" majority
shareholders when the corporation is in shaky financial condition;52
misconduct by directors, officers, or controlling shareholders in con-
nection with the corporation's issuance of stock options;53 a corpora-
tion's payment of a property dividend in securities of a subsidiary,
where some of the directors withheld information from other direc-
tors about the desirability of such a dividend;54 a corporation's sale
of its assets for stock in another company if information material to
the transaction is withheld from minority shareholders, e.g., infor-
mation that the corporation's board of directors which recom-
mended the sale was composed solely of directors and officers of the
buyer;5 5 a partially owned subsidiary's loan on unfair terms to the
parent company in return for the parent's demand note;56 a fraudu-
lent dissolution of a corporation that converts a minority holder's
shares into a claim for cash;5 7 and perhaps, under some cir-
cumstances, a controlling shareholder's sale of his interest in a
company at a premium. 58 Whenever a transaction falling within the
so Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971); Rekant v. Desser, 425
F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed.
2'0 (1970); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain States
Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
5' Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970) (allegation that corporation purchased
securities at inflated price); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970) (allegation that
corporation would be caused to purchase securities under disadvantageous terms).
-2 See N. Lattin, R. Jennings, & R. Buxbaum, Corporations: Cases and Materials 1395
(4th ed. 1968).
-1 See Jacobs, supra note 16, at 80-86.
54 International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
932 (1974) (a "sale" by the dividend-declaring corporation even though its shareholders were
not required to give any consideration in return for the dividend). Cf. SEC v. Datronics
Eng'rs, 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 927 (1974) (corporation which
spun off newly acquired unregistered securities in other companies to its shareholders violated
Rule 10b-5 because of untrue statements made to the shareholders in connection with the
spin-offs).
s' Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969) (suit does not
fail even though the sale would have been approved in any event by the seller's shareholders,
since the purchaser controlled 87 percent of the seller's stock). See also Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
56 Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1973).
57 Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973)
(district court, with court of appeals affirming, granted actual and punitive damages to
plaintiff: a minority shareholder's right to relief under Rule 10b-5 is not defeated because the
fraudulent scheme failed and the defrauding majority shareholder did not reap a profit. 474
F.2d at 1043).
18 See Ferraioli v. Cantor, 281 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Haberman v.
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ambit of Rule 10b-5 harms the corporation, as many of the transac-
tions listed above do, a shareholder in the corporation can bring a
derivative action under Rule 10b-5 on its behalf.
Often the deception of which a minority shareholder complains
relates to misstatements in proxy solicitation material sent to
shareholders or the failure in proxy solicitation material to disclose
relevant information. That the defective proxy material used in
accomplishing a fraudulent scheme provides a cause of action based
on proxy regulation violations does not bar a shareholder's resort to
section 10(b) and Rule lob-5. 59 Indeed, an aggrieved shareholder
often bases his suit on violations of both federal proxy regulations
and Rule 10b-5. 60
E. Prospects for the Continued Expansion of Rule 10b-5
The various kinds of oppressive conduct mentioned herein as
falling within the ambit of Rule 10b-5 are illustrative only. Courts
can be expected to extend the application of the Rule in the future to
cover new schemes by corporate directors and controlling share-
holders to oppress or squeeze out minority shareholders. The United
States Supreme Court has quoted with approval the following lan-
guage from an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit:
"[We do not] think it sound to dismiss a complaint
merely because the alleged scheme does not involve the
type of fraud that is 'usually associated with the sale or
purchase of securities.' We believe that § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices
employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or pre-
sent a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical
methods should not provide immunity from the securities
laws. "6 1
Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972); Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally, R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation: Cases and
Materials 1227-29 (3d ed. 1972); Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 369 (1973); Note, 10
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 743 (1969). For various kinds of corporate mismanagement which
may give rise to a Rule 10b-5 cause of action, see generally Jacobs, supra note 16, at 75-104.
See also note 16 supra.
59 Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326, 1330 (7th Cir. 1969).
60 See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974) (violations of
the tender offer provisions of the Williams Act); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384
F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Williams v. Pennsylvania Co., 367 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) (violations of the antitrust provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts).
61 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7 (1971), quoting
A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967). See also White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
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And along the same line, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has commented that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "are
not intended as a specification of particular acts or practices that
constitute 'manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances,' but
are instead designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices that
are alien to the 'climate of fair dealing' . *.".., Other courts talk in
terms of "loosening the strictures" on the applicability of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 6 3
In the relatively few cases in which the United States Supreme
Court has considered section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it has definitely
taken an expansionist approach to the interpretation of those provi-
sions. It has indicated, for example, that whenever a person suffers
an injury as a result of a fraudulent or deceptive practice "touching"
a sale of securities, the practice meets the "in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security" requirement and falls within the
scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.64 This holding puts to rest an
argument advanced in some of the lower federal courts that a
securities transaction must be central to the fraud in order for those
provisions to apply.65 Under the Supreme Court's view a tenuous
connection between the fraud and a securities transaction suffices.
The Supreme Court has also held that where a purchaser of se-
curities withholds from the seller information affecting the value
of the securities, the seller in some circumstances, at least (e.g.,
face-to-face dealings), is not required to show reliance on the non-
disclosure in order to recover under Rule 10b-5: "All that is neces-
sary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reason-
62 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 1970), quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 201 (1963).
63 Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 11973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 94,206, at 94,881 (S.D.N.V. 1973).
64 See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
See also Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965)
(holding that corporation impliedly represented to plaintiff when she purchased her shares on
the market in 1945 that if it ever entered into a merger it would do so only on terms that were
fair to her and that therefore plaintiff's allegation that a 1960 merger was unfair stated a Rule
10b-5 cause of action). In commenting on the Voege case, R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities
Regulation: Cases and Materials (2d ed. 1972), state: "One would have to go back at least
several hundred years to find such a palpable creation of a fiction by a court to seize
jurisdiction not otherwise conferred upon it." Id. at 1230.
65 See Cox, supra note 16, at 680. See also Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d
579, 595 (5th Cir. 1974); Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., [1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,206, at 94,881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (concluding that, with its
"touching" language the Supreme Court "intentionally avoided the language previously used
by lower courts to the effect that a securities transaction cannot be merely 'incidental' to a
fraudulent scheme or objective."). In Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1971)
(reversing on rehearing en banc an earlier decision on authority of the Supreme Court's
decision in the Bankers Life case, 404 U.S. 6 (1971)), the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that Rule 10b-5 liability arises only when fraud is "intrinsic to the securities
transaction itself." 453 F.2d at 732.
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able investor might have considered them important in the making
of [his investment] decision; ' 66 the "obligation to disclose and this
withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of
causation in fact."67
Despite considerable litigation and the courts' expansionist ten-
dencies, doubt still exists as to the standard to be applied in deter-
mining what corporate mismanagement falls within the ambit of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In the past, most of the Rule 10b-5
cases had involved "deception," i.e., a fraudulent misrepresentation
or a failure to disclose information that might affect the investment
decision of a "seller" or "buyer" of securities. However, in internal
mismanagement cases, where the corporation itself is usually the
immediately injured party and the harm to a minority shareholder is
derivative, as where controlling shareholder-directors cause the cor-
poration to issue shares to themselves at an inadequate price, the
element of "deception" in a l0b-5 action plays a different and
perhaps lesser role. How can a corporation be "deceived" by those
who make its decisions? One line of cases suggests that relief will be
available to the corporation in a derivative suit under Rule l0b-5
whenever the wrongdoers withhold material facts from some mem-
bers of the board of directors, and if all members of the board are
involved in the wrongful transaction, whenever the wrongdoers fail
to disclose material facts to some of the shareholders.68 Another line
of decisions has developed a so-called "controlling influence" stan-
dard, which does not require a showing of deception at all in 10b-5
actions based on management-induced transactions: all plaintiffs
must show is that: (1) the defendants, in bringing about a transac-
tion, exerted "controlling influence" over the corporation; and (2) the
transaction was unfair to the corporation. 69 This concept of liability
66 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
67 Id. at 154. For other authorities discussing causation in Rule 10b-S cases, see Swanson
v. American Consumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1969); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff,
271 F. Supp. 378, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341, 344
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Comment, 114 Pa. L. Rev. 578, 582-84 (1966). But see Hoover v, Allen, 241
F. Supp. 213, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
68 Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968), Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed. 280 (1970)
(deception of independent shareholders constitutes deception of the corporation); Ruckle v. Roto
Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) (failure of a majority of the board of directors to disclose
to the remaining directors all the material facts about a proposed issuance of stock can constitute
fraud on the corporation actionable under the Rule). Cf. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764,
767-69 (2d Cir. 1974) (where entire board was aware of all material information relative to an
exchange of stock, the directors' action merely constituted breach of fiduciary duty, which as
such was not actionable under the Rule). See also Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972) (a merger in which directors acting for the
controlling shareholders undervalued the securities the corporation received for its common
stock and so issued more shares than appropriate in the merger); Cox, supra note 16.
69 Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872,
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under Rule 10b-5, which has been denominated "new fraud" by
some commentators, 70 of course greatly increases the reach of the
Rule in corporate mismanagement cases. However, expansion has
not proceeded without some backtracking, as the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in one fairly recent deci-
sion, has given new vigor to the "deception" requirement for Rule
10b-5 applicability. 71
IV. ADVANTAGES OF SEEKING RELIEF UNDER RULE 10b-5
The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of
Rule 10b-5. 72 A proceeding under Rule 10b-5 in a federal court has
a number of advantages over an action in a state court based on state
law to redress some forms of shareholder oppression. In the first
place, an action under Rule 10b-5 may furnish a remedy to an
oppressed shareholder for the redress of an injury for which relief
might not be available under state law. In transactions to which
Rule 10b-5 applies, it seemingly imposes at least as strict a fiduciary
duty on directors, officers and shareholders as that imposed by the
laws of most states. 73 Further, in a state in which appraisal and
379-82 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See generally Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to
Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332 (1969); Note,
The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule lob-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86
Harv. L. Rev. 1007 (1973).
70 Jacobs, supra note 16, at 57-61; Comment, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1103 (1969).
71 Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972), holds that Rule lob-5 does not apply
to an unfair merger if there was no deception in obtaining shareholder approval of it. Id. at
719-20. (Query, whether the holding of the case covers a self-dealing or other unfair transac-
tion where there is full disclosure but shareholder approval is not sought). In Popkin,
plaintiff, seeking to enjoin a merger on the ground that the exchange ratio proposed in the
merger plan was unfair, admitted that "full and fair" disclosure had been made in the proxy
statement sent to shareholders asking for proxies to vote in favor of the merger. The court
held that Rule lOb-5 did not provide a basis for relief, pointing out that minority shareholders
could sue under the state law to enjoin the merger if it was, in fact, unfair. The court
commented that "[s]ection 10(b) ... and Rule lOb-5 are designed principally to impose a duty
to disclose and inform rather than to become enmeshed in passing judgments on information
elicited." Id. at 719-20. The Popkin decision is severely criticized in Note, The Controlling
Influence Standard in Rule lob-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1007,
1040-46 (1973).
72 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
73 Furthermore, in the leading case of Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 . .. (1909),
the Supreme Court found common law fraud by an insider in the purchase of stock
from a minority shareholder, even though "perfect silence was kept" by the defen-
dant. Surely we would suppose that Rule l0b-5 is as stringent in this respect as the
federal common law rule which preceded it.
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
See also Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (if a
director or officer violates Rule lOb-5 in purchasing stock in his corporation, the seller can
recover profits the director or officer realized because of the stock's appreciation in value,
irrespective of whether the appreciation was foreseeable at the time of the purchase. "It is
more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit of windfalls than to let the fraudu-
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purchase of a dissenter's shares under a dissenter's rights statute is
the only remedy available to a shareholder aggrieved by a merger of
other fundamental corporate change, 74 a dissenting shareholder whobrings his suit in federal court under Rule 10b-5 is not limited to the
appraisal-and-purchase remedy because federal law governs what
relief is available to redress violations of federal securities laws."
A proceeding under Rule 10b-5 may also have venue andprocedural advantages over a proceeding in a state court. A plaintiff
asserting a right under the Rule may choose as a forum the districtin which "the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transactsbusiness" or the district where "any act or transaction" violative ofthe Rule took place.7 6 Further, under the so-called "co-conspirator"
theory of venue, whenever the action being brought is a multi-
defendant securities proceeding in which a common scheme of acts
or transactions to violate the securities acts is alleged, and venue is
established for any of the defendants in the forum district, venue inthat district is extended to cover the other defendants, even in the
absence of any contact or substantial contact by any of the otherdefendants within that district.77 Thus, a plaintiff bringing a Rule
lent party keep them." Id. at 786). CL SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798,800-02 (E.D. Pa. 1947); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).The federal courts have also expanded the class of persons liable under Rule lob-5 wellbeyond the officer, director and majority shareholder categories typically subjected to liabilityfor trading on inside information under the law in a minority of states. See SEC v. Texas GulfSulphur Co., supra. In Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), three persons actedas conduits to pass stock from minority shareholders to the majority shareholder at a price of$120 per share, although the conduits and the majority shareholder knew that the corporationplanned a private offering of its shares at $300 a share and public offering at $600 a share.Two of the conduits were not shareholders and held no official position with the corporation;they were merely close friends of the controlling family group with knowledge of the impend-ing private and public offerings. Nevertheless, the two conduits were held jointly and
severally liable on three alternatives theories: (1) they were "insiders," i.e., persons who "hadsuch a relationship to the corporation that [they] had access to information which should beused 'only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,' " id. at 409; (2)they were " 'tippees' persons given information by insiders in breach of trusts," id. at 410; and(3) they were "aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5," id. at 410, quoting from In reCady, Roberts, supra at 912.
For comparisons of state law liability with liability under Rule 10b-5, compare Hill, TheSale of Controlling Shares, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986 (1957), with Folk, Corporation LawDevelopments-1969, 56 Va. L. Rev. 755 (1970) and Leech, Transactions in Corporate
Control, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725 (1956).
74 See F. O'Neal, "Squeeze-Outs" of Minority Shareholders: Expulsion or Oppression ofBusiness Associates § 5.29 (to be published in 1975).
75 Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
76 Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). The courts have been liberal indetermining that a transaction violative of the Rule occurred in the forum district. SeeLowenfels, Rule 10b-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Action, 8 Vand. L. Rev. 893, 899(1965).
77 Wyndham Associates v. Binfliff, 398 F.2d 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977
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10b-5 action may have considerable room for choice in selecting a
forum. Further, a plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 action enjoys the benefit
of nation-wide service of process; process may be served on a
defendant in any district in which he is an inhabitant or wherever
he can be found. 78 Defendants upon whom service of process in a
state proceeding would be impossible, difficult or expensive are
easily reached in a Rule 10b-5 proceeding. In addition, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, especially those applicable to discovery
procedures 79 and class actions,80 are more liberal than are the rules
of some state courts. Perhaps another advantage of an action under
Rule 10b-5 is that it may be possible to reach a larger number of
defendants in that kind of action because conspiracy theories and
aiding and abetting theories are readily available for use. 81 On
occasion, a plaintiff may be able to obtain a more favorable applica-
tion of the statute of limitations by proceeding under Rule 10b-5
rather than bringing a suit based on state law. 82 Finally, state
statutes requiring shareholders bringing derivative actions to post
security for expenses, including attorneys' fees, are not applicable to
actions brought under Rule 10b-5. 83
V. CONCLUSION
In its first forty years of existence, section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, bolstered by Rule 10b-5, has proved to
be of greater benefit to oppressed minority shareholders than its
draftsman could reasonably have expected. Undoubtedly, the
courts' application of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to many corpo-
rate "dirty tricks" is largely due to the broad language of the
provisions themselves. A contributing cause to expansive applica-
(1968); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973); Zorn v.
Anderson, 263 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
78 For cases in which defendants have been served outside the district in which the suit
was brought, see Clapp v. Stearns & Co., 299 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
79 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
o Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
s' See O'Neal, supra n.69, at § 7.10.
'2 See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783-84 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965) (even though the period of limitation for actions brought under Rule lOb-5 is deter-
mined by state law, federal law determines the date of an action's accrual; federal law
establishes with more liberality than Massachusetts law that if fraud is involved, a cause of
action does not arise until discovery of the fraud).
83 See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292
F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961). The state security-for-expense statute
applies, however, to any pendent jurisdiction state cause of action. Phelps v. Burnham, 327
F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1964). The amount of bond required might be diminished by the fact that
the defense of the state claim would probably largely duplicate the defense of the federal
claim.
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
tion of Rule 10b-5 has been the lamentable failure of state statutory
and common law to protect adequately the reasonable expectations
of minority shareholders.8 4 Indeed, while Rule 10b-5 has become
increasingly effective in protecting minority shareholders, some
commentators have discovered a pronounced trend in state corpora-
tion law toward less shareholder protection.8 5 However, regardless
of the reasons behind the expansion of Rule 10b-5 as a remedy for
squeeze-outs or oppression of minority shareholders, still further
expansion in this area should be expected.
84 F. O'Neal & J. Derwin, Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates: "Squeeze-
Outs" in Small Enterprises, ch. 8 (1961); O'Neal supra n.69, at ch. 9.
1- See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale LJ.
663 (1974); Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. Law. 35 (1966).
